In their excellent monograph, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs, Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch argue for an account of legitimate criminalisation based on wrongfulness, the Harm Principle and the Offence Principle, while they reject an independent anti-paternalism principle. To put it at its simplest my aim in the present paper is to examine the relationship between 'the harms' and 'the wrongs' of the authors' title.
I begin by comparing the authors' version of the Harm and Offence Principle with some other influential accounts. After examining the (considerable) role wrongfulness plays in their work, I ask what there is left for their Harm and Offence Principles to do. In the light of the understanding and foundations of the Harm and Offence Principles proposed by the authors, I suggest that the answer is little or nothing. The wrongfulness constraint the authors place on their Offence Principle comes close to swallowing it up entirely. Furthermore the part of their Offence Principle that is not thus swallowed by wrongfulness leaves the account with a commitment that is probably best dropped. As far as their Harm Principle is concerned I suggest that the authors' account of 'harm' is so broad that it lacks the resources to distinguish harm-based reasons from wrongfulness-or immorality-based reasons in any principled way. Among other things, I ask in this context, first, whether one can be harmed as one's character deteriorates and, secondly, whether one is harmed by virtue of the serious wrong one does to another.
What really drives the authors' account of legitimate criminalisation, I believe, is wrongfulness together with an important, amorphous set of potential defeating conditions. They themselves accept such a picture so far as paternalism is concerned. I conclude that their account, which I think has considerable force, would lose little of any significance were their Harm and Offence Principles simply excised. More generally I suspect that a strong role for wrongfulness in an account of legitimate criminalisation is likely to put into serious question the plausibility of an independent principled role for harm and offence. by wrongfulness leaves the account with a commitment that is probably best dropped. As far as their Harm Principle is concerned I suggest that the authors' account of 'harm' is so broad that it lacks the resources to distinguish harm-based reasons from wrongfulness-or immorality-based reasons in any principled way. Among other things, I ask in this context, first, whether one can be harmed as one's character deteriorates and, secondly, whether one is harmed by virtue of the serious wrong one does to another.
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II. The Harm Principle: Scope and Derivation
The Harm Principle in the form we now know it originates with John Stuart Mill's On Liberty. Mill summarises his argument in a famous paragraph which included the words 'The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.' 3 Plainly the principle applies to the coercive use of the criminal law, even if the scope of the principle was intended by Mill to range more widely. 4 My concern will not be with Mill's version of the Harm Principle as such, but I will begin by considering two aspects of it as prelude to an examination of Simester and von Hirsch's version. First I say something about the scope of Mill's principle, focussing in particular on what it rules out. Secondly I consider briefly the foundations or the derivation of Mill's principle.
The scope of Mill's Harm Principle, at least in its canonical formulation, differs from that of
Simester and von Hirsch. 5 Mill's principle rules out criminalisation (1) to prevent immoral conduct;
(2) to prevent offensive conduct; and (3) to prevent conduct on paternalist grounds, that is conduct which, although possibly harmful, is harmful only to the coerced or criminalised person him-or herself. Legitimate criminalisation, in short, on Mill's canonical formulation, necessarily requires harm to others. Since Mill wrote, the Harm Principle has been supported by an impressive collection of liberal thinkers, most notably H.L. A Hart, Joel Feinberg and Joseph Raz. 6 These writers all modify
Mill's principle in various ways. Feinberg for one argued that Mill's principle, rather than excluding offence as a ground for legitimate criminalisation, ought to be supplemented with it, allowing criminalisation in suitable circumstances on the basis of offensive, rather than harmful, conduct. 7 Simester and von Hirsch take a view on offence qua ground for legitimate criminalisation that appears to lie in between Mill's outright rejection of it and Feinberg's embrace of it. The authors agree with
Feinberg that the Harm Principle ought to be supplemented by an Offence Principle, but they do not accept that the Offence Principle can, so to speak, entirely go it alone . In other words, they 3 The edition of Mill to which I have referred is John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford University Press, World's Classics Edition (1991) . However, when citing On Liberty I will follow the now common practice of citing the relevant chapter and paragraph number, so it does not matter which of the many editions of the work is consulted. The quoted words above are from Chapter 1, paragraph 9. 4 Mill states that the principle is (also) to apply to 'legal penalties' in general and to the 'moral coercion of public opinion.' On Liberty, Chapter 1, paragraph 9. 5 Unless otherwise indicated when discussing 'Mill's principle,' I am referring to the canonical formulation of it he makes himself in Chapter 1, paragraph 9 of On Liberty. Possibly Mill's argument in On Liberty as a whole or in his philosophy more widely may support a broader principle than the one he himself formulates, but I shall not consider that complex and interesting question here. 6 H.L. A Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality, Oxford University Press (1963) ; Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 4 volumes (1) Harm to Others (1984) ; (2) Offense to Others (1985) ; (3) Harm to Self (1986) ; (4) Harmless Wrongdoing (1990) , all Oxford University Press; Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press (1986) . 7 Feinberg, Offense to Others (1985) . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 4 believe, offensive conduct that is in no way harmful, cannot ground legitimate criminalisation, but the logic of what they take to be legitimate offence-based criminalisation differs from harm-based criminalisation to such an extent that we do better, they think, to adopt a separate Offence Principle.
Moreover, they argue, the presence of the right sort of offence rationale allows a loosening of the constraints that apply even to criminalisation on the basis of the Harm Principle in isolation. I say more about the authors' views on offence below.
A second example of a significant modification of Mill' 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 Simester and von Hirsch likewise believe that the Harm Principle must contain a wrongfulness constraint. Helpfully they condense their views on the place of wrongfulness into three theses. As we will see, at least two of them are ecumenical so far as any debate between proponents of the Harm Principle, on the one hand, and Legal Moralists on the other are concerned.
1. That Φing is wrongful is necessary to justify its criminalisation (Necessity Thesis)
2. That Φing is wrongful is insufficient to justify its criminalisation (Insufficiency Thesis)
3. That Φing is wrongful is insufficient to establish even a pro tanto ground for its criminalisation (Non-qualifying Thesis).
Let us examine each in turn.
As far as the Necessity Thesis is concerned, the authors tell us that it is most easily defended by reference to the distinctive nature of the criminal law, which punishes and censures offenders for their conduct (23). The criminal law blames people and 'one cannot blame a person unless that person does something morally wrong; that is, unless she does something that, all-things-considered, she ought not to do (23). By criminalising the activity of Φing, say the authors:
the state declares that Φing is morally wrongful; it instructs citizens not to Φ; it warns them that, if they Φ, they are liable to be convicted and punished within specific ranges (the levels of which signify the seriousness with which Φing is regarded); and, further, the state undertakes that, on proof of D's Φing, it will impose an appropriate measure of punishment, within the specified range, that reflects the blameworthiness of D's conduct.
The authors think (and I agree) that this account captures both a way in which criminalisation actually (often) occurs and is an 'archetype' of how it ought to occur. The authors' archetype has a dual structure. Criminalisation, according to it, has both a conditional and a categorical dimension, that is, the regulation of Φing in effect by charging actors for the right to perform the action. Taxation and criminalisation, were one to understand both as forms of admission cost regulation, are not so much different in kind as in degree, the former imposing costs on the pocket, the latter imposing costs beyond the pocket to loss of liberty (or where there is capital punishment, life). It is, however, quite implausible to understand the criminal law in this way: Simester and von Hirsch are right to lay the emphasis where they do. The message of the law of murder for example is that it is forbidden, not that, or not merely that, it is going to be extremely costly to murder someone.
Placing moral wrongfulness and blame at the centre of a characterisation of criminalisation, as do
Simester and von Hirsch, is to argue for a moralised view of the criminal law as opposed to a nonmoralised view, as for example admission cost regulation. This, as I have just suggested, is highly plausible. Immediately after sketching their archetype, the authors, however, assert that it contains, 'the features that can make criminalisation morally legitimate.' (7) 26 Now I am not sure whether this claim ought to be taken literally in the unqualified form in which it is made, for it is plainly a claim asserted the same thing. 27 It is also one that would be shared with any legal moralist. For even a legal moralist who believes that the wrongfulness of an activity is a strong reason for criminalising it will accept that there may be many kinds of reasons that could yet defeat the case for its criminalisation.
Michael Moore for one would accept this point. His version of legal moralism is a particularly strong one, according to which the function of the criminal law is to achieve retributive justice by punishing 'all and only those who are morally culpable in the doing of some morally wrongful action.'
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Nevertheless in a given instance, it may not be right to criminalise the activity all-things-considered.
One sort of case, according to Moore, is conduct which, as experience teaches us, will be engaged in inevitably whether or not the law intervenes:
..for behaviour that will be engaged in anyway even if legislated against, there will be a peculiar effect of prohibition, namely the raising of the prices of the products or services necessary for such behaviour; this, in turn, may increase the profits of supplying such services or products, which in turn sustains organized criminal activities. This is typically known as the 'crime tariff'. Prostitution, for example, does not go away by being legislated against, as the experience of all societies has shown. By making it criminal, however, the supply is artificially restricted to those willing to engage in criminal behaviour, so that prices and profits are such as to draw in organized criminal activity.
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For the sake of argument, let us accept that prostitution is morally wrongful. Doing so does not on
Moore's account establish that prostitution ought to be criminalised because that fails to take account of the new problems that criminalisation may cause in this context. The best solution on this understanding, that the wrongful activity ceases or is significantly curtailed, may be out of reach. The legal moralist might then conclude that the second best solution-which may be to do nothing-is preferable to the third best in which underground highly exploitative gangs can flourish as a result of the criminalisation of the activity.
Again some legal moralists in some contexts may insist that one should not only do the right thing, but that one should do the right thing for the right reason. Plainly coercing someone into doing the right thing, whatever else there may be to say in its favour, does not lead to their doing the right thing for the right reason in the short-term and is probably unlikely to in the long-term. Again wrongfulness may be insufficient if the cost is too high in terms of the rule of law 30 The authors in their penultimate chapter have a fine discussion of many of the pertinent features supporting the , 1994, 301) . Simester and von Hirsch, I take it, do not mean to suggest that the wrongfulness of which they speak may turn out to be illusory. The idea is that the wrongfulness may be defeated or overridden, not that it is a mirage that can mislead until one looks really hard at the phenomena. Blackburn continues, 'A more modern usage prefers the title "pro tanto obligation": an obligation inasmuch as there is this or that aspect of the situation, but again suspending the all-in verdict.' I shall therefore assume that when they say prima facie, they mean pro tanto on the understanding just described. Non-qualifying Thesis B* There exist wrongful Φings whose wrongfulness is sufficient to establish a pro tanto ground for criminalisation.
Accordingly, on this idea, the wrongfulness of murder and rape for example are highly likely to be sufficient pro tanto grounds for criminalisation, indeed grounds that in the event are unlikely in the extreme to be defeated by any combination of the considerations we considered in our discussion of criminalisation, which must be based on some other factor, such as its harmfulness.
While this is a possible position to take, if it is the authors' view of the place of wrongfulness, it still remains far too hard as I see it to reconcile it with a lot of other things they say. To put it at its starkest, I cannot see how the authors can consistently say that the wrongfulness of rape or murder is no positive reason, not even a reason subject to potential defeat, for its criminalisation. It is true enough of course that the Harm Principle, waiting as it is in the wings for the authors, will be well placed to justify the criminalisation of murder and rape, so the position under consideration would not lead to absurd consequences. 37 As we have seen, however, the authors' account of the nature of Surely, then, the authors must be read as endorsing the much weaker Non-qualifying Thesis, B, as formulated above. The claim in this case is simply that there are kinds of wrongful Φing whose wrongfulness is insufficient to establish even a pro tanto ground for criminalisation. That as we have seen is consistent with there being (plenty of) kinds of wrongful Φing whose wrongfulness is sufficient to establish such a pro tanto ground for criminalisation. They then avoid the implausible implication that the wrongfulness of murder or rape is no sort of positive pro tanto reason for criminalising both. There are other points in the book where the weaker interpretation seems to be assumed. 'If,' they say, 'there are harm-based constraints on state intervention to regulate wrongs,' as of course they believe there are, 'they complement and do not displace the wrongfulness requirement' (21). A reading of this as requiring wrongfulness merely as a condition, rather than as an object of criminalisation would not be impossible, but it is more natural, I think, to read it as suggesting that wrongfulness can have an independent reason-giving pull.
As I have said, this is a thesis that is easy for the authors' legal moralist opponents to accept.
The legal moralists can accept in other words that criminalisation requires (1) wrongfulness that is (2) subject to defeating conditions on a case-by-case basis so that (3) wrongfulness is insufficient for criminalisation and (4) only a subset (which may be a large subset-the size is to be determined) of moral wrongs provide pro tanto reasons for criminalisation. Finally, another point the authors make namely (5) that something can be wrongful because it is harmful (20) is also a claim that is in no way inconsistent with legal moralism. The key question then, which I consider in the remainder of the paper, regards the necessity or desirability of supplementing these conditions with a Harm Principle and/or an Offence Principle. Why in short if conduct is wrongful in the right way and able to that says rape is wrongful because it is harmful. In short I think they must believe that the sheer use of another, the mark for them of the wrongness of rape, gives a pro tanto positive reason for criminalisation, albeit one that is inconclusive because also subject to the Harm Principle. I comment on this argument in John overcome the range of 'defeaters' of the Insufficiency Thesis must it also be harmful or offensiveand-harmful in order to be legitimately criminalised?
IV. Offence
Should the criminal law be concerned with protecting people from being offended? And if so, is the concern so important that we should develop and support a dedicated principle of criminalisation in its name? The authors believe both questions should be answered in the affirmative and devote a large part-nearly a quarter-of the monograph to a defence of the Offence Principle (91-138). Their account, however, is heavily qualified and a significant measure of their energies goes into explaining the precise sense in which they support the Offence Principle. As we saw above the authors defend an
Offence Principle that is independent of the Harm Principle, though they stop short of allowing that offence, entirely in the absence of harm, can legitimate the criminalisation of conduct. I therefore referred to it as semi-detached or semi-independent. They do allow, however, that the conditions on the requisite harm, when combined with relevant offence, can to an extent be relaxed by way of comparison with harm as a ground without offence. Therefore any verdict on the Offence Principle will ultimately depend on a verdict on the Harm Principle. I shall not, however, consider the latter until the next section. What is needed to prevent the Offence Principle from being so seriously overbroad, say
Simester and von Hirsch, is the provision of good enough reasons for holding that the defendant's conduct is offensive. The mere fact that offence is or may be taken by people is insufficient. The key question ought to be whether the state has prima facie reason to prohibit D from Φing. The very demand for reasons, they think, is the appropriate way to limit the potentially large scope of offence as a ground for criminalisation. What could give good enough reasons to turn affront into a valid ground for criminalising conduct? The authors stress again the requirement that criminalisation requires a wrong (95). To criminalise offensive conduct, they remind us, is to condemn that conduct through its proscription and the labelling of an offender as a wrongdoer. A plausible claim of wrongdoing is therefore needed. In the context of offensive conduct, the kinds of wrong in play are likely to involve conduct that is 'grossly inconsiderate or disrespectful' (106-107). Moreover, the authors suggest, 'People have a prima facie claim, grounded in human dignity, against intentional demeaning treatment,'(98) the violation of which can presumably be wrongful. However hot under the collar any number of people may get about the Day-Glo ties under the collars of some of their fellow citizens, the latters' conduct is not grossly inconsiderate or disrespectful or an affront to anyone's dignity, so there is no question of its being criminalised as far as the authors are concerned.
In other words by way of contrast with Feinberg the authors shift the emphasis of their
Offence Principle from the psychological to the normative. No affront to sensibilities is pertinent to criminalisation unless it is backed up by appropriate reasons based on wrongdoing. It seems to me highly plausible to argue, as they do, that affront to sensibility, even affront to many sensibilities, is insufficient as a basis for legitimate criminalisation. What seems more dubious, as I will explain, is their apparent belief that affront to sensibility still has a significant role in criminalisation. Such an affront appears to be a necessary component in their Offence Principle. I will seek to make two points about the authors' treatment of offence, first that most of the heavy lifting in it is, so to speak, being done by wrongfulness, rather than offence. Secondly, that where distinctive work is being done by offence itself, it may be better that it is not done at all. Ultimately I suspect the authors' direction of travel away from Feinberg's 'psychological' notion of offence, towards a reasons-based, wrongfulness-based normative notion has the momentum to take their account to a place in which offence itself becomes unnecessary.
In order to make these points clear it will be useful to make a comparison. As far as the practical pay-off of their Offence Principle is concerned, the authors believe that it may be the best route to the justification of suitably specified and qualified offences based for example on insult and exhibitionism. Incitement to hatred-in particular racial hatred-is the most prominent example deployed by them of a kind of crime that may legitimately be criminalised under their Offence
Principle. This makes for an interesting contrast with defences of the legitimacy of crimes of The protection of dignity, on the one hand, and the protection of persons from offence should be drawn in the following way:
The distinction is in large part between objective and social aspects of a person's standing in society, on the one hand, and subjective aspects of feelings, including hurt, shock and anger, on the other. A person's dignity or reputation has to do with how things are with respect to them in society, not with how things feel to them. Or at least that is true in the first instance.
Of course an assault on one's dignity will be felt as hurtful and debilitating. And no doubt those who assault another's dignity in this way will be hoping for certain psychological effects-hoping to cultivate among minority members a traumatic sense of not being trusted,
19 not being respected, not being perceived as worthy of ordinary citizenship, a sense of being always vulnerable to discriminatory and humiliating exclusions and insults. Those feelings will naturally accompany an assault on dignity, but they are not the root of the matter.
43
I suggested above that it may turn out to be hard to point to a difference in substance between
Simester and von Hirsch's views and those of Waldron despite their strongly contrasting conclusions on offence in relation to the relevant crimes of incitement. Simester and von Hirsch, after all, are unimpressed by the subjective aspects of feelings and so on of which Waldron speaks alone. For them such feelings only take on any significance for criminalisation when backed by wrongs, such as gross inconsideration, disrespect and so on. They even refer, as we have seen, to dignity itself in this context. In Waldron's terminology, the authors insist that the subjective must be supplemented by the objective to qualify for criminalisation. Is the difference, then, between Waldron on the one hand and were wrong to set such store by the victim's perception of the words directed at him. The victim's personality was such that he was resilient or broad-shouldered. That, the Court decided, was irrelevant to the question of whether the assault was racially aggravated.
Neither Waldron nor the authors are explicitly concerned with crimes of the sort charged in
Woods, that is base crimes like assault that are aggravated because they manifest or are motivated by certain kinds of hatred and I do not mean to ascribe any view to either party on the legitimacy of such is also insufficient to trigger the principle. On Waldron's dignitarian view, affronts to sensibilities are insufficient to trigger the protection of the criminal law, but they are also not necessary. As with the authors, for Waldron the psychological aspect without the normative aspect is insufficient, but unlike them the normative aspect for him does not require the psychological aspect.
If I am right that there is at least this difference between the bases on which Simester and von Hirsch on the one hand and Waldron on the other seek to defend the legitimacy of certain incitement to hatred crimes so that the difference between them is not merely verbal, that raises the question of which is the better view. Where there is a wrong, where someone has good reason to feel affronted, but because she is stoical or robust she does not, that strikes me as an insufficient basis for withdrawing the protection that someone of ordinary sensibilities would get. Avishai Margalit, writing about the notion of humiliation in the political context makes a point with the same structure. He suggests that humiliation in the political context should be conceived as 'any sort of behaviour or condition that constitutes a sound reason for a person to consider his or her self-respect injured.' 45 He formulates the idea in this way in order to emphasise that his idea is normative in nature, not psychological. As he explains 'on the one hand, the normative sense does not entail that the person who has been provided with a sound reason for feeling humiliated actually feels that way. On the other hand, the psychological sense of humiliation does not entail that the person who feels humiliated has a sound reason for this feeling. The emphasis is on reasons for feeling humiliation as a result of others' behaviour.'
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Perhaps an analogous point is also evident in the altogether different context of debates about distributive justice. In the relevant literature two characters are discussed. Tiny Tim has severe disabilities but is unusually stoical and has a sunny disposition. Louis, by contrast, has expensive tastes and needs 'pre-phylloxera claret and plovers' eggs if he is to have a high enough level of psychological happiness. 47 Ronald Dworkin argues that Louis should not be compensated for his expensive tastes, on the one hand, and Tiny Tim should not be denied equal resources because his psychological welfare is already relatively high. Similarly-and I take this to be consistent with Waldron's position-that someone with very good reason to believe or feel that her dignity under the own position is best interpreted in accordance with Non-qualifying Thesis B, rather than A. I suspect that most of the excellent discussion of various contexts of criminalisation to be found in the authors' work needs no further assumptions at this base level. As far as paternalism is concerned, as we noted early on, the authors depart from Mill and Feinberg in asserting no principled block on criminalisation on such grounds. Instead they consider the legitimacy of paternalist criminalisation on a case-by-case basis, armed with some helpful generalisations of the kind we encountered in our discussion of the 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Insufficiency Thesis, in the event usually rejecting criminalisation on this basis. This already conforms to the broad legal moralist understanding to which I have just alluded.
As far as offence is concerned, the authors' stated position is not similarly compatible with legal moralism. But I have suggested that it is far from clear that their Offence Principle is either necessary or desirable. Its necessity is called into question by the fact that, on the authors' account, the essential normative work is being done by wrongfulness anyway. Why not simply discuss the relevant issues as questions about the wrongfulness constraint on criminalisation and about potential defeating conditions? Its desirability is called into question by the fact that where offence itself-as a psychological notion-is making a distinctive contribution to the account, it is perhaps better that it not do so. According to Raz, 'without… a connection to a moral theory the harm principle is a formal principle lacking specific concrete content and leading to no policy conclusions.' 50 He himself understands 'harm' in terms of the setback to or denial of autonomy and adds 'people who deny the moral value of autonomy will not be committed to denying that there are harms, nor that harming people is, as such, The very reason why bare trespass is a difficult case is that the wrongdoer's action violates the landowner's right but causes no actual harm. To hold otherwise would be to make a merely formal move, modifying our conception of harm within the Harm Principle in order to include bare right-violations, and thereby disguising without dissolving the problem posed by harmless wrongdoing (50-51).
What is the authors' account, then, of harm and does it avoid the danger of 'disguising without It strikes me, then, that the authors have not done anything to block such a wide reading of 'harm.' Could it be that they do not actually wish to exclude 'moral harm' from their understanding of harm? They do at one point in the book refer to 'corruption' as a justification for criminalisation.
They consider the House of Lords decision in Brown. 62 In this well known case, the infliction of minor bodily harm on another, fully consenting, person was held to constitute an offence where the means involved sadomasochistic sexual activity. The authors cite Lord Jauncey's justification for this conclusion, asserting that the legalisation of such activities might encourage the seduction and 'corruption of young men.' In response the authors say:
But would it? It is an easy claim to make when no supporting data is offered. Given the presumption against criminalisation, the onus is on its proponents to supply evidence that creating a new offence will help to prevent harm from occurring (36).
They make a good point against Lord Jauncey's alleged justification. The onus is surely indeed on the proponent of specific criminalisation to supply the evidence. Assuming, by contrast, that the onus to supply the criterion of harm is on the theorist, the authors might here be taken to imply that there is nothing wrong with 'corruption' of another as such a harm, only that Lord Jauncey's justification is far too weak because it offers no evidence and it fails to explain why consenting young men (I take it this means young men and not minors) would be corrupted by engaging in more of the conduct in question. In other words the problem alluded to in Brown is not that corruption is not harmful, but that no evidence was on offer that anyone was corrupted. However, this short passage is ultimately insufficient to tell us one way or another whether they would actually endorse 'moral harm' as harm. however, also harmed (that is, inflicts harm on himself) in a way that is not simply reducible to the harm of getting caught or punished or, as the case may be, suffering intense feelings of guilt. Plainly this does not lead one to sympathise with the perpetrator, or if it does, it does only in some way that is utterly different and secondary to how one sympathises with the victim. Intuitively, however, it seems to me there is also a self-harm to the perpetrator here. To try to make sense of this, one might ask what it means for something to be bad for someone, as opposed to being simply bad? According to 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 simply to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The authors are by contrast seeking to exclude justifications based on pure wrongdoing or pure immorality. And that is different.
Formally speaking the point is correct. However, as Feinberg saw, moralism and paternalism can be formulated in such a way that the overlap between them can be very considerable, possibly even near-total. For any genuine claim of pure moralism or pure wrongdoing, will be ruled as a harm, if only it can be said to be bad for the actor or the person whose character is in question. 
VI. Conclusion
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